This paper examines the distribution of earnings in a new model of hierarchical multi-task organizations. Each such organization is defined by a finite set of workers and tasks together with a production function that maps each allocation of workers to the tasks into an aggregate output. Tasks are ordered in degree of importance so that aggregate output increases when a worker climbs up the organization ladder. We show that the generalized Banzhaf value proposed by Freixas [1] can be used as a theory of revenue sharing in such organizations, and provide a new interpretation and formulation of this sharing rule, proving that a worker's pay is proportional to the difference between his marginal productivity at the top level and at the bottom level of the hierarchy summed over all the possible configurations of the organization. This new formulation also facilitates computation.
Introduction
This paper studies the distribution of earnings in a new model of hierarchical organizations introduced in Pongou et al. [2] . Each such organization is defined by a finite set of workers and tasks, and a production function that maps each allocation of workers to the tasks into an aggregate output. Tasks are ordered in degree of importance so that aggregate output increases when a worker climbs up the organization ladder. Assuming that the organization is competitive, output converts directly into revenue.
We adapt the generalized Banzhaf value proposed by Freixas [1] as a theory of revenue sharing in such organizations. This notion is an extension of the concept known as the Banzhaf-Coleman value. It was independently proposed by Banzhaf [3] and Coleman [4] as a measure of the ability of a voter to affect the outcome of a voting game. An axiomatic study of this value was conducted by Dubey and Shapley [5] and Laruelle and Valenciano [6] . Important applications of the Banzhaf value to corporations and corporate governance can be found in Leech [7, 8] . Feltkamp [9] generalizes the axiomatic approach to any transferable utility cooperative game. In the context of the firm, a cooperative game can be viewed as a hierarchical organization that has only two levels. In an attempt to generalize this notion, Freixas and Zwicker [10] introduce the concept of simple games. A   , j k   , j k simple game can be interpreted as a hierarchical organization that has levels of hierarchy, and is equipped with a real-valued production function whose range has cardinality . In our model of a hierarchical organization, is not fixed, but is endogenously determined by the production function. Freixas [1] generalizes the relative Banzhaf value to this class of games. Diffo Lambo and Moulen [11] and Freixas et al. [12] study this value in relation to other theories within the class of (2, 2) simple games, and Tchantcho et al. [13] and Pongou et al. [14] extend this analysis to the class of (3, 2) simple games.
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A new formulation and interpretation of the generalized Banzhaf value is provided. It proves that in a hierarchical organization, the Banzhaf value of a worker is proportional to the difference between his marginal productivity at the top level and at the bottom level of the hierarchy summed over all the possible configurations of the organization. This new formulation also makes this notion very easy to compute.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines hierarchical organizations. In Section 3, a new formulation of the generalized Banzhaf value is provided. Section 4 concludes.
Hierarchical Organizations
An organization is a list   , , N T V where is a non-N Copyright © 2012 SciRes. TEL empty finite set of workers,
a finite collection of finite sets of tasks with cardinility = 2 T j  , and a production function that maps each allocation of workers to the tasks into a real number which measures the aggregate output or productivity of the organization under that particular configuration (Pongou et al. [2] ). For every , i is a set of identical tasks. Denote by i a representative task of i . An allocation of workers to the tasks is a j-partition
A is the set of workers assigned to type tasks (or simply to task i ). Under an allocation
, i A may be empty for any , which would mean that no worker has been assigned to task . The set of all possible allocations is denoted
In a hierarchical organization, tasks are ordered in degree of importance: 1 is the most important task, 2 the second most important task, and so on. A typical example is a military organization where each higherranking member is more competent and has more important tasks than his subordinates. A hierarchical organization is said to be monotonic if aggregate output increases as a worker moves from a less important task to a more important one. The concept of monotonicity is formalized below.
the set of workers executing a task at least as important as task . Let 1 be an ordered j-partition of such that for any . That is, is obtained from by moving some workers to more important tasks. This is denoted by
. A multi-task organization is said to be monotonic if for any ordered j-partitions
The Generalized Banzhaf Value and a New Formulation
The generalized Banzhaf value developed by Freixas [1] is adapted to our framework as follows. Let   , ,V N T be a monotonic hierarchical organization, and the range of Without loss of generality, assume 1 
Denote 2) The normalized Banzhaf index of is:
The Banzhaf index of a worker measures his earnings in terms of the proportion of the organization's revenue he is expected to obtain. Our goal is to give a new interpretation of this sharing rule. Let A be an allocation of workers and p N  a worker. Denote by 
The definition below will be needed in the proof of Theorem 1. 
Thus is any representative j-partition in the class ,

A
On the other hand, p It follows that: t . T produ tion function of the organization is defined in the second column. The difference betwe n the marginal productivity at the top level and at the bottom level of the hierarchy is given in the third column for worker p and in the fourth column for worker q .
4-Partition (A)
V(A signed to ta ctively, and no he c [1] . A new interpretation of this sharing rule has been given. More precisely, in any hierarchical organization, the normalized Banzhaf value of a worker is proportional to the difference between his marginal productivity at the top level and at the bottom level of the hierarchy summed over all the possible configurations of the organization. This new formulation is also easy to compute. 
Conclusion
